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Supply Chain Risk Network Management: A Bayesian Belief Network and
Expected Utility Based Approach for Managing Supply Chain Risks
Abstract
The paper develops and operationalises a supply chain risk network management (SCRNM) process
that captures interdependencies between risks, multiple (potentially conflicting) performance measures
and risk mitigation strategies within a (risk) network setting. The process helps in prioritising risks
and strategies specific to the decision maker’s risk appetite. The process is demonstrated through
a case study conducted in a global manufacturing supply chain involving semi-structured interviews
and focus group sessions with experts in risk management. Theoretically grounded in the framework
of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the modelling approach
has a number of distinctive characteristics. It utilises a top-down approach of Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA). Performance measures are identified first and subsequently connected to risks. A ‘probability-
conditional expected utility’ matrix is introduced to reflect the propagation impact of interdependent
risks on all performance measures identified. A ‘weighted net evaluation of risk mitigation’ method is
proposed and the method of ‘swing weights’ is used to capture the trade-off between the efficacy of
strategies and the associated cost keeping in view the decision maker’s risk appetite. The approach
adapts and integrates techniques from safety and reliability engineering (FTA), decision making under
uncertainty (EUT), and multi-criteria decision analysis (swing weights). The merits and challenges
associated with the implementation of interdependency based frameworks are discussed. Propositions
are presented to elucidate the significance of modelling interdependency between risks and strategies.
Keywords: Supply Chain Risk Network Management, Interdependencies, Multiple Performance Mea-
sures, Risk Mitigation Strategies, Bayesian Belief Networks, Expected Utility.
1. Introduction
Aiming for competitive advantage, firms operating across the global marketplace are exposed to
considerable risk (Tang & Tomlin, 2008; Christopher et al., 2011; Blos & Miyagi, 2015). The com-
mencement of research in supply chain risk management (SCRM) dates back to the early years of
21st century (Harland et al., 2003; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). There is an
extensive literature on SCRM that considers conceptual theory building facets as well as empirical
investigations of best practice in managing risks. This literature has been well-considered in numerous
literature reviews (Ju¨ttner et al., 2003; Tang, 2006; Tang & Nurmaya Musa, 2011; Colicchia & Strozzi,
2012; Heckmann et al., 2015). There are two major research gaps that necessitate immediate attention:
first, the existing SCRM processes/frameworks have limited focus on the interdependency modelling
1
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of risks (Colicchia & Strozzi, 2012; Garvey et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Qazi et al., 2017); and second,
the risk appetite of a decision maker is not exclusively captured in general while prioritising risks and
risk mitigation strategies (Heckmann et al., 2015).
Supply chains operate within an integrated setting of interdependent firms and even within a single
firm, entities and risks are not isolated; rather, there are complex chains of interaction. Classification
of supply chain risks has been explored comprehensively resulting in identification of independent
categories of risks for aiding the risk identification stage of the SCRM process (Manuj & Mentzer,
2008; Ho et al., 2015; Heckmann et al., 2015). However, risk identification must involve different
stakeholders and capture the interdependent interaction between risks ranging across the entire supply
network (Ackermann et al., 2014). Current risk classification schemes and methods investigating
optimal treatment of individual risks can prove to be sub-optimal if there are correlations between
risks and strategies (Garvey et al., 2015). According to Ho et al. (2015): “Investigating the joint
impact of such risks can lead to better management of supply chains than treating each risk type in
isolation. ... However, there is lack of research measuring the correlations between risk factors and
corresponding risk types, or the probability of occurrence of particular risk types associated with their
factors” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 5060).
The risk appetite of a decision maker drives the tolerance level with respect to the acceptance of
risks and therefore, it is extremely important to integrate risk appetite within the decision making
framework. According to Heckmann et al. (2015, p. 127): “The decision maker’s degree of acceptance
with respect to the deterioration of target-values defines his attitude towards supply chain risk. Risk-
averse supply chain managers only accept a minor deterioration of target values of an efficiency- (or
effectiveness-) based supply chain goal in exchange for the adherence or increase of an effectiveness-
(or efficiency-) based supply chain goal. Risk-seeking decision makers, however, accept higher degrees
of value deterioration of a specific goal in exchange for the adherence or increase of an opposite one.
Risk-neutral supply chain managers prefer neither of the two objective types”. Very few frameworks in
SCRM have captured the risk appetite of a decision maker, and where they have risks are treated as
independent (Knemeyer et al., 2009; Lavastre et al., 2012). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no
existing study has ever investigated designing a risk management framework within a network setting
of interacting risks in which the risk appetite of a decision maker is taken into account.
Risk mitigation strategies are implemented in order to reduce the likelihood of occurrence and/or
negative impact of risks (Tang & Tomlin, 2008). Robust strategies must be developed in order to help
firms reduce cost and/or improve customer satisfaction under normal conditions and enable firms to
sustain operations during and after the occurrence of a disruption (Tang, 2006). Despite the significance
of evaluating risk mitigation strategies specific to a portfolio of supply chain risks, very few studies
have proposed tools to prioritise strategies subject to a budget constraint (Micheli et al., 2014; Aqlan
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& Lam, 2015; Qazi et al., 2017), and where they have risk preferences have not been taken into
account. Although Expected Utility Theory (EUT) provides a standardised normative framework to
make decisions under uncertainty, it is not so much used in practice mainly because of the difficulty
associated with assigning utility values to all possible outcomes (Aven & Kristensen, 2005).
A number of established techniques have been utilised to identify, assess and treat supply chain
risks (Colicchia & Strozzi, 2012; Ho et al., 2015). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) being widely used in the
literature on system safety and reliability engineering (Ashrafi et al., 2015) is considered an effective
technique for managing supply chain risks (Oehmen et al., 2009; Sherwin et al., 2016). The technique
is used to identify a top event (occurrence of a risk) and develop a network of causal factors leading
to the top event. It can serve as a useful framework for identifying performance measures (top events)
and developing a risk network (comprising supply chain risks) leading to the performance measures.
However, there is a need to overcome the limitation of FTA by means of modelling common cause
factors within the risk network. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) provide a very useful framework
for capturing probabilistic interdependency between uncertain variables and some recent studies have
proposed BBN based frameworks to model and assess supply chain risks (Garvey et al., 2015; Qazi
et al., 2017).
There are several contributions of this paper. First, we develop and operationalise a supply chain
risk network management (SCRNM) process that captures interdependencies between risks, multi-
ple (potentially conflicting) performance measures and risk mitigation strategies helping to prioritise
risks and strategies specific to the decision maker’s risk appetite, and demonstrate its application
through a case study. Second, the proposed operationalisation scheme adapts established techniques
from safety and reliability engineering, decision making under uncertainty and multi-criteria decision
analysis, and integrates these together across different stages of the risk management process: risk
identification- BBNs and FTA are utilised to develop a risk and performance network thereby cap-
turing interdependency between risks (including common cause failures) and focussing exclusively on
material risks specific to the performance measures identified; risk analysis- BBNs and EUT are used
to assess and map risks on the proposed ‘probability-conditional expected utility’ matrix in order to
capture the impact of risks on all performance measures rather than a single monetary measure used
in the conventional risk matrix based tools; risk treatment- ‘weighted net evaluation of risk mitigation’
is introduced and the method of ‘swing weights’ (Belton & Stewart, 2002) utilised to establish the
trade-off between efficacy of potential risk mitigation strategies and the associated cost considering the
decision maker’s risk appetite. There is an added benefit of the process as besides modelling interde-
pendency between risks, the utility for both risk appetite and trade-off across performance measures
is exclusively captured whereas modelling these features in silo would undermine the integrated effect
of complex interactions involved. Third, we present merits and challenges associated with the imple-
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Figure 1: Research focus and methodology.
mentation of such interdependency based frameworks. Fourth, we develop propositions to elucidate
the importance of accounting for interdependence of risks and risk mitigation strategies.
Responding to the call for developing and empirically evaluating a SCRM process that not only
captures interdependency between risks but also integrates all stages of the process (Colicchia & Strozzi,
2012; Ho et al., 2015), we address the following research questions in this study:
RQ1: How can we develop and operationalise a SCRM process that captures interdependencies
between risks, multiple (potentially conflicting) objectives (performance measures) and risk mitigation
strategies specific to the risk appetite of a decision maker?
RQ2: What are the merits and challenges associated with the implementation of the proposed
process?
An overview of the research focus and the methodology adopted is shown in Figure 1. The remainder
of the paper is organised as follows: An overview of the relevant literature is presented in Section 2.
The proposed process and the methodology are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The case
study conducted for demonstrating the application of the proposed process is presented in Section 5.
We discuss the implications of our findings and introduce propositions in Section 6. Finally, we present
conclusions and directions for future research in Section 7.
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2. Literature Review
In the following sections, we give an overview of the literature on supply chain risk management
process and interdependency modelling of supply chain risks.
2.1. Supply Chain Risk Management Process/Framework
SCRM is “the identification and management of risks for the supply chain, through a co-ordinated
approach amongst supply chain members, to reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole” (Ju¨ttner
et al., 2003, p. 201). Several risk management frameworks have been proposed using different ter-
minology; however, there is a consensus that a SCRM process involves five sequential stages: risk
identification; assessment; analysis; treatment; and monitoring (Giannakis & Papadopoulos, 2016).
Selected articles conforming to the research focus of the paper (see Figure 1) have been classified into
four categories including interdependency modelling of risks, the risk appetite of a decision maker,
interdependency between risks and strategies, and research methodology as shown in Table A.1 (see
Appendix A).
Ritchie & Brindley (2007) identified five components of a SCRM process: risk drivers (primary
and secondary level); risk management influencers (rewards, supply chain risks, timescales, portfolio);
decision maker characteristics (perceptions, risk profile, attitudes, experiences); risk management re-
sponses (risk taking, avoidance, mitigation, monitoring); and performance outcomes (profit related,
strategic positioning, personal). We will briefly describe the merits of some of the frameworks proposed
in the literature, and delineate the main limitations of these.
A number of qualitative frameworks have been proposed to identify risks and prescribe generalised
strategies to deal with important risks. These frameworks generally utilise qualitative scales to discre-
tise the conventional risk matrix across the probability and impact levels. Utilising a Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) based technique, Sinha et al. (2004) developed a process to manage risks
in the aerospace industry whereas Giannakis & Papadopoulos (2016) proposed a risk management pro-
cess to identify and manage sustainability related risks across the environmental, social and economic
facets with its application demonstrated through empirical case studies and a survey questionnaire.
Khan et al. (2008) reported the conventional risk matrix based process used in a major UK retailer
that helps the company deal with design oriented supply chain risks. Bringing the perspective of a
global supply chain and consolidating the concepts from logistics, supply chain management, operations
management, strategy and international business management, Manuj & Mentzer (2008) proposed a
procedure to help global supply chain managers identify risks and select appropriate strategies.
Quantitative frameworks have utilised hybrid methods to assess and manage risks. For example,
Elleuch et al. (2014) combined FMEA, design of experiments, discrete event simulation, Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and desirability function approach to develop a process and applied it to a
5
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pharmaceutical supply chain case study. Similarly, Aqlan & Lam (2015) proposed a hybrid approach
of bow-tie analysis and stochastic integer programming to identify critical risks and assess suitable
strategies taking into account their cost and effectiveness in reducing the risk exposure. Systems
thinking has also been applied to develop a comprehensive process both in its qualitative (Oehmen
et al., 2009) and quantitative forms (Ghadge et al., 2013).
There are mainly three limitations of the existing frameworks including the aforementioned studies.
First, the frameworks have drawn limited focus on modelling the common cause failures and assessing
their propagation impact. As such common cause failures can have a far reaching impact on the
efficiency of a supply network, there is a need to model and evaluate such factors (Ho et al., 2015).
Second, researchers generally focus on limited stages of the risk management process whereas “there
is a significant relationship between all SCRM processes, (therefore) more attention should be given
to legitimately integrated processes instead of individual or fragmented processes. ... Similarly, the
effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies requires explicit quantification of effectiveness and efficiency
of such strategies” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 5053). Third, there has been a very limited focus on the need for
integrating risk appetite in the risk management process as Heckmann et al. (2015) argue that “More
advanced (context-sensitive) approaches especially with respect to the risk attitude of the decision maker
and with respect to the environment of the affected supply chain are needed” (Heckmann et al., 2015, p.
130). We endeavour to fill the mentioned gaps by developing and empirically evaluating an integrated
SCRNM process to establish how practitioners perceive correlations between risks specific to their risk
appetite and whether they are able to evaluate the impact of risk mitigation strategies on the network
of risks.
2.2. Interdependency Modelling of Supply Chain Risks
Various models have been proposed to capture interdependency between supply chain risks. In-
terpretive structural modelling (ISM) is a hierarchy based technique that establishes the order and
direction of complex relationships among elements of a system. It has been used to determine causal
relationships between risk mitigation strategies (Faisal et al., 2006) and supply chain risks (Pfohl et al.,
2011). Related to the same family of causal mapping techniques, fishbone diagram has been utilised
to identify cause-effect relationships between risks (Lin & Zhou, 2011). Mapping a supply network
as a web of interconnected nodes, measures from the Social Network Analysis have been adapted to
identify critical supply nodes (Kim et al., 2011). The main limitation of aforementioned techniques is
the inability to capture the strength of interdependency between risks.
AHP is a technique to conduct pair-wise comparisons between variables and identify their relative
importance. Its application varies from the risk assessment of suppliers (Ganguly, 2014) to the pri-
oritisation of supply chain performance measures (Gaudenzi & Borghesi, 2006). FMEA is a technique
to prioritise risks depending on the relative product of probability, severity and detectability associ-
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ated with each risk. It has been extensively used in SCRM to identify critical risks (Nepal & Yadav,
2015; Dong & Cooper, 2016). Similarly, utilising established techniques from the field of reliability
engineering, Aqlan & Lam (2015) proposed a bow-tie analysis based process to capture the interde-
pendency of supply chain risks whereas Oehmen et al. (2009) and Sherwin et al. (2016) introduced
FTA based frameworks to assess risks. The main problem with these techniques is their limited focus
on capturing common cause failures. Although the conventional FTA does not capture common cause
failures, the technique following a top-down approach is helpful in terms of brainstorming the causes
of a consequence and is widely used in the literature on engineering risk management (Sherwin et al.,
2016).
Mainly, supply chain risks are classified into distinct categories like process, control, demand,
supply and environmental risks (Christopher & Peck, 2004). The first two risk categories relate to
factors internal to an organisation, the third and fourth include factors internal to the supply chain,
but external to the organisation and the fifth category relates to factors external to the supply chain.
Similar to the concept of mapping causal chains in project risk management (Ackermann et al., 2014),
Badurdeen et al. (2014) proposed a risk taxonomy capturing interdependency between supply chain
risks that is in contrast with the established classification schemes.
In response to the call for understanding the relationships between a set of strategies for managing
risks and corresponding impact on performance measures (Colicchia & Strozzi, 2012), a few models
have been developed (Micheli et al., 2014; Aqlan & Lam, 2015); however, these models do not explicitly
capture interdependency between risks. Another issue relates to the focus of these models on “min-
imising cost or maximising profit as a single objective” (Colicchia & Strozzi, 2012, p. 412) as “purely
cost-and waste-considering objectives, however, evaluate supply chain’s performance in retrospect. They
miss to assess both operational effectiveness and important strategic achievements like product quality
and customer satisfaction” (Heckmann et al., 2015, p. 130). In this study, we overcome the limitation
of earlier studies by not only capturing interdependencies between risks but also across the entire risk
management process. We also consider optimising a set of potentially conflicting performance measures
within an interdependent setting of interacting risks and strategies, and propose a new technique for
prioritising risk mitigation strategies subject to a budget constraint.
2.2.1. Application of Bayesian Belief Networks in Supply Chain Risk Management
BBNs offer a unique feature of modelling risks combining both the statistical data and subjective
judgement in case of non-availability of data (Sigurdsson et al., 2001; Kelangath et al., 2011). Although
BBNs have been extensively used in the field of risk management (Norrington et al., 2008), their
application to the field of SCRM is mainly focussed on addressing specific problems involving supplier
selection, supplier assessment and ranking of suppliers. Recently, few models have been proposed
to capture the supply network-wide web of risks. However, existing approaches have not considered
7
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Table 1: Comparison of the Proposed Approach with Existing BBN Based SCRM Models.
framing and operationalising a comprehensive risk management process integrating suitable techniques
across all stages of the process. Furthermore, the merits and challenges involved in implementing such
a framework remain unexplored. A comparison of the merits of this paper with existing studies is
presented in Table 1.
Lockamy & McCormack (2009) developed a model for benchmarking supplier risks involving risk
events related to supplier network, internal operations and external factors. They used surveys and
interviews for collection of data from both the internal and external company sources and applied the
model on a group of 15 automotive casting suppliers for a major automotive company in US. Similarly,
Badurdeen et al. (2014) proposed a tool for assessing supply risks and conducted sensitivity analysis to
help Boeing company benchmark its Tier 1 suppliers. Addressing the supplier selection problem, Dogan
& Aydin (2011) developed a model combining Total Cost of Ownership and BBN methods and applied
it in automotive industry to help Tier 1 suppliers select their own suppliers whereas Hosseini & Barker
(2016) introduced a framework focussing on resilience-based supplier criteria. The main problem with
the utility of these models relates to their exclusive focus on a specific problem without adapting
BBNs to the realm of SCRM and capturing complex nature of interdependent supply chain risks. For
example, the criteria related to the supplier selection or benchmarking process are well established and
BBNs can readily be applied to formulate a network structure without any adaptation. However, in the
case of modelling interdependent risks across a supply chain, there is an added complexity involved in
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establishing the network structure that necessitates adapting BBNs to the context of SCRM whereas
the literature does not provide an illustration of developing such models.
Leerojanaprapa et al. (2013) and Leerojanaprapa (2014) proposed a generic BBN modelling pro-
cess to support supply chain risk analysis based on expert knowledge and conducted a case study
in the medical supply chain to demonstrate its efficacy. In their effort to capture the probabilistic
interdependency between supply chain risks, Garvey et al. (2015) introduced an algorithm to map
risks and proposed supply chain risk measures. The main limitation of these studies is their focus on
limited stages of the risk management process and ignoring the risk appetite of a decision maker. Also,
modelling of risks in accordance with the process flow of a supply chain makes it infeasible to capture
risks relating to substantial supply networks. However, these studies serve to illustrate the efficacy
of BBNs in modelling and managing supply chain risks as BBNs can effectively measure the propa-
gation impact of these risks within a network setting. Utilising BBNs, Qazi et al. (2017) introduced
probabilistic supply chain risk measures to prioritise interdependent risks and strategies. Although
one of the measures introduced captures an aversion to risk, the entire risk management process does
not explicitly model the risk attitude (utility) of a decision maker and also, the process only helps in
optimising a portfolio of strategies specific to a single performance measure (objective) rather than
considering multiple (potentially conflicting) measures (objectives). We endeavour to fill these gaps
through introducing and operationalising a comprehensive SCRNM process that adapts key features of
established techniques from safety and reliability engineering, decision making under uncertainty and
multi-criteria decision analysis to the context of SCRM.
3. Proposed SCRNM Process
There are many studies in the literature with exclusive focus on the impact of supply chain risks
on performance measures (Ju¨ttner et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2013), however, the main limitation of
these studies is modelling risks in silo whereas we focus on modelling a risk network and evaluating its
holistic impact on performance measures. We also capture the moderating effect of a risk management
process through modelling risk mitigation strategies within the risk network. Therefore, the established
framework proposed by Ju¨ttner et al. (2003) is modified to account for the holistic (negative) impact of
a supply chain risk network on (potentially conflicting) supply chain performance measures as shown
in Figure 2. Also, the efficacy of a risk management process influences the impact of a risk network
on performance measures as selecting effective strategies would mitigate the consequence of risks.
The steps involved in the risk management process are shown in Figure 3. Like the standard risk
management process (SA, 2009), the proposed process starts with establishing the context in terms
of defining the scope of the supply chain and its boundaries. The main purpose of the modelling and
analysis is ascertained through interviewing the decision maker or the main stakeholders. The decision
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A risk management process integrating a web of interacting risks 
and performance measures 
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Figure 2: Supply chain risk management framework (adapted from Ju¨ttner et al. 2003).
maker also helps in identifying the key performance measures pertinent to the supply chain.
A focus group session must be conducted to identify risks and develop a causal network. We found
it very useful to develop the causal network using the top-down approach where the informants were
asked to link each performance measure with the corresponding risk(s) that were in turn linked back
to causal factors. In a way, it mimics the technique adopted in conventional FTA (Sherwin et al.,
2016); however, FTA does not capture the common-cause failures whereas we model such factors in
our framework. Studies on developing the qualitative part of the BBNs and causal maps are useful in
establishing the risk network (Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004). Once the qualitative network is developed,
there is a need to validate the structure and ensure whether all relevant risks have been considered. A
focus group session involving all participants from the previous session and adding some new members
is helpful in refining the structure and adding some missing risks. It is important to note that it is
an iterative process until the final structure is validated and the participants are satisfied with the
structure of the risk network.
The next stage relates to the quantitative modelling of the already validated qualitative risk network
where the participants establish the strength of interdependency between the risks either through semi-
structured interviews or a focus group session. Once all the conditional probability values have been
elicited, a focus group session must be held to validate the model. Again studies specific to the
quantitative modelling of BBNs are useful in developing and validating the model (Norrington et al.,
2008). Sensitivity analysis is carried out to evaluate the impact of individual risks on each performance
measure and ascertain whether the results make sense and conform to the perception of the participants.
In case of any discrepancy, the quantitative model is revisited and amendments incorporated until the
sensitivity results are agreed upon.
Following the validation of a quantitative model, the decision maker is consulted with regard to the
identification of potential risk mitigation strategies, associated cost and the budget constraint. A focus
group session must be held to identify the connection of strategies with relevant risks and establish the
efficacy of strategies in reducing the probability of risks. There is also a need for validating the efficacy
10
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Figure 3: Proposed supply chain risk network management process.
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of risk mitigation strategies. The decision maker is again consulted to determine the utility function
corresponding to the performance measures and the cost of strategies. The model is subsequently run
for all possible combinations of strategies subject to various budget constraints and the strategies are
selected that maximise the overall expected utility of the decision maker. Finally, a focus group session
is conducted to communicate the results to the participants and help the decision maker understand
the impact of implementing different combinations of strategies. As risk management is a continuous
process, the entire process is repeated requiring minimal changes in the model once new risks are
discovered and updated.
4. Methodology
An important aim of this study is to empirically evaluate the proposed process through a case
study in order to demonstrate the application of the process and establish the benefits and challenges
associated with its implementation. The empirical evaluation of the process involved establishing the
context of a specific organisation (case) and developing a model based on how the decision makers
perceived interdependencies between risks and why certain risks and performance measures were given
due importance (study). As the “case study method is an appropriate choice for investigating ‘how’
and ‘why’ questions” (Yin, 2009, p. 27), we adopted the same methodology to address the research
questions.
Aero (a leading global technology provider) was selected for conducting the case study as their
risk managers were keen on improving the risk management process within the company and assessing
the merits and challenges of our proposed process. The initial interview protocol was piloted with
Zanardi Fonderie (an Italian global manufacturing company specialising in the heat treatment of iron
and its alloys) that helped in revising the questions to clarify the terms and adopting a well-structured
method to develop the risk network in the case study. The main data collection method was semi-
structured interviews as “the overwhelming strength of the face-to-face interview is the ‘richness’ of the
communication that is possible” (Gillham, 2000, p. 62) and “the semi-structured interview is the most
important form of interviewing in case study research and it can be the richest single source of data”
(Gillham, 2000, p. 63). As our research involved developing a risk network, the case study design
utilised a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence.
In order to obviate the chance of misrepresentation and loss of data, all interviews were audio-
taped with the permission of respondents. Also, two researchers were engaged in conducting the case
study in order to ensure the validity of research and the guidelines provided by Nadkarni & Shenoy
(2004) and Pitchforth & Mengersen (2013) were strictly followed to validate the models developed.
Following the interviews, the authors transcribed the recordings and validated the data internally and
performed content analysis for data reduction and concept identification. Subsequently, the transcripts
12
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and deduced themes were shared with the interviewees for validation. Besides interviews, secondary
data including publicly available corporate reports, case studies and annual performance reports were
collected and analysed in order to triangulate the data collected through interviews and focus group
sessions. Finally, a case study report was prepared and shared with the company to validate the
authenticity of results and help the participants identify any issues.
4.1. Proposed Modelling Approach
A number of techniques including but not limited to AHP, Analytical network process, Fuzzy set
theory, ISM, Network theory, FMEA and hybrid methods integrating these have been extensively
used in modelling supply chain risks. The main limitation of these techniques is the inability to
comprehensively capture probabilistic interdependency between risks and to propagate and update
beliefs upon receiving new information. Based on the efficacy of BBNs in capturing interdependencies
between risks, we consider BBN based modelling of a risk network as an effective approach. Such
a modelling technique can help managers visualise supply chain risks and take effective mitigation
strategies. BBNs have already been explored in the literature on risk management (Ashrafi et al.,
2015; Wu et al., 2015) and SCRM (Garvey et al., 2015; Nepal & Yadav, 2015; Qazi et al., 2017)
for modelling and assessing risks. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, BBNs have not
been explored in the literature on SCRM to establish the impact of supply chain risks on multiple
(potentially conflicting) objectives and to prioritise supply chain risk mitigation strategies considering
the risk appetite of a decision maker. Another contribution of the proposed approach relates to the
adaptation of established techniques from safety and reliability engineering, decision making under
uncertainty and multi-criteria decision analysis, and integrating these together to operationalise the
proposed process.
Interdependency modelling has been extensively explored in other research areas especially the
reliability and safety of engineering systems and also, well-established techniques like BBNs and EUT
are commonly used in capturing interdependency between risks and modelling the risk appetite of a
decision maker, respectively (Aven & Kristensen, 2005; Aven, 2015). However, these methods and risk
management frameworks are not readily (directly) applicable to modelling and managing supply chain
risks mainly because of the complex and unique features of supply chain risks: unlike risks associated
with engineering (physical) systems, supply chain risks involve soft factors like people risks and corpo-
rate governance issues; the layout (qualitative causal structure) of a physical system is generally known
whereas it is very difficult (not viable) to accurately model a supply network and corresponding risks
because of the number of suppliers and entities involved; components within a physical system can
readily be monitored for any malfunction whereas it might not be possible to detect a risk occurring
within a supply chain where not all stakeholders are incentivised to share any private information with
regards to the realisation of a risk or their reliability; engineering systems are maintained and improved
13
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through the use of established interdependency based models and maintenance (and accident) data
recorded whereas such data is not readily available in the case of supply chain risks as practitioners
rely on risk matrix based tools and interdependency modelling is generally ignored (Leerojanaprapa,
2014). Therefore, there is a need to adapt the interdependency based tools commonly used in other
areas to the context of SCRM such that the complexity associated with supply chain risks is managed
effectively and the tools developed fit well with the requirements and competence of practitioners who
prefer to use simple risk matrix based tools.
In order to capture the risk appetite of a decision maker, we make use of EUT. However, instead of
utilising the conventional technique to elicit a decision maker’s preference over the entire combination
of risks, we introduce a new approach of mapping the combination of risks to a set of performance
measures making it feasible for capturing the risk appetite over a substantial risk network. This
adaptation not only reduces the elicitation burden of ascertaining utility values but also helps in
evaluating risks specific to global supply chains where the complex nature of interdependency between
risks is not amenable to conventional SCRM techniques. Integrating BBNs with EUT provides an
added benefit as besides modelling interdependency between risks, the utility for both risk appetite
and trade-off across performance measures is exclusively captured whereas modelling these features in
silo would undermine the integrated effect of the complex interactions involved. As such, the complexity
relates to the interdependent nature of supply chain risks, non-linear interactions between risks and
performance measures, utility of the decision maker with regards to the trade-off across these measures,
and their risk appetite in terms of establishing the maximum level of risk exposure and the utility of
risk mitigation with regards to the cost incurred in introducing strategies. Our approach deals with
capturing this complexity in a unique manner and integrates all these features in a holistic framework.
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of the BBNs and EUT as these have been used
to develop the proposed modelling approach.
4.1.1. Bayesian Belief Networks
BBN is a graphical framework for modelling uncertainty. BBNs have their background in statis-
tics and artificial intelligence and were first introduced in the 1980s for dealing with uncertainty in
knowledge-based systems (Sigurdsson et al., 2001). They have been successfully used in addressing
problems related to a number of diverse specialties including reliability modelling, medical diagnosis,
geographical information systems, and aviation safety management among others. For understand-
ing the mechanics and modelling of BBNs, interested readers may consult Sigurdsson et al. (2001);
Nadkarni & Shenoy (2004); Jensen & Nielsen (2007). A BBN consists of the following elements:
• A set of variables (each having a finite set of mutually exclusive events) and a set of directed
edges between variables forming an acyclic directed graph; a directed graph is acyclic if there is
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no directed path X1 → ...→ Xn so that X1 = Xn, furthermore, the directed edges represent sta-
tistical relations if the BBN is constructed from the data whereas they represent causal relations
if they have been gathered from experts’ opinion,
• A conditional probability table P (X|Y1, ...Yn) attached to each variable X with parents Y1, ..., Yn.
Chain Rule for Bayesian Belief Networks. Let a Bayesian Network be specified over X = X1, ..., Xn.
The structure of a BBN implies that the value of a particular node is conditional only on the values of
its parent nodes. Therefore, the unique joint probability distribution P (X) representing the product
of all conditional probability tables is given as follows:
P (X) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|pa(Xi)) (1)
where pa(Xi) are the parents of Xi.
Merits and Challenges. BBNs present a useful technique for capturing interdependency between supply
chain risks (Badurdeen et al., 2014). Another advantage of using BBNs for modelling supply chain
risks is their ability of back propagation that helps in determining the probability of an event that may
not be observed directly. They provide a clear graphical structure that most people find intuitive to
understand. Besides, it becomes possible to conduct flexible inference based on partial observations,
which allows for reasoning. Another important feature of using BBNs is to conduct what-if scenarios.
There are certain problems associated with the use of BBNs: along with the increase in number of nodes
representing uncertain variables, a considerable amount of data is required in populating the network
with (conditional) probability values; similarly, there are also computational challenges associated with
the increase in number of nodes.
4.1.2. Expected Utility and Decision Making under Uncertainty
Within the context of decision making under uncertainty, risk can be related to a utility function
that reflects the preferences of a decision maker with regard to various possible consequences of a
decision. Expected utility theory posits that a decision-maker’s preferences over an outcome x can be
represented by a utility function u(x), and if there are i = 1, . . . , n possible states of the world each of
which occurs with probability pi and in which the outcome is xi then the decision-maker cares about
their expected utility
∑n
i=1 piu(xi). Faced with a set of alternatives, a decision maker will choose
among those alternatives by selecting the option that yields the highest expected utility. The shape
of the utility function captures the risk attitude of a decision maker: for a risk averse individual it
will be concave; for risk seeking convex; and for a risk neutral individual it will be linear. Risk averse
(seeking) decision makers would always choose (decline) a certain option over a risky option with the
same expected value; so in particular risk averse individuals need compensating for taking on risk.
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4.1.3. Proposed Approach
Although EUT provides a standardised normative framework to make decisions under uncertainty,
it is not so much used in practice mainly because of the difficulty associated with assigning utility
values to all possible outcomes (Aven & Kristensen, 2005). If a network consists of N risks each of
which has binary outcomes then there are 2N utility values that must be elicited, which is potentially a
very large number. To circumvent this difficulty, we introduce a new approach to evaluating a network
of interconnected risks.
Let a risk network be combined of j = 1, . . . , N interdependent binary risks denoted Rj that can
take the value ‘true’ or ‘false’. Rather than assessing the state of each risk, it will be assumed that the
combination of these risks can be summarised in M < N binary performance measures denoted ml,
l = 1, . . . ,M , that can take the value ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The probability that each risk is realised in the
network combines to determine the probability of each performance measure being ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
A state of the network is a particular realisation of performance measures, each of which can be
either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. We denote a typical state si ∈ {good, bad}
M ; there are 2M possible states in the
set of states that we denote by I. Decision makers are assumed to evaluate a realisation of the network
in a particular state by the combination of performance measures that are realised in that state. As
such, we define the decision-maker’s utility function as
u : {good, bad}M → [0, 1] (2)
where utility evaluations are scaled to take a value on the unit interval. The probability that state i
occurs is the joint probability that each of the performance measures takes its value specified by the
state, that we denote pi. Decision makers are then assumed to evaluate the expected utility of the
network:
EU =
∑
i∈I
piu(si). (3)
As the state of risks influences performance measures, we introduce the notion of risk propagation
measure (RPM) to capture the relative impact of each risk on the set of performance measures modelled
within a risk network. RPMj is the probability weighted expected utility of the network if risk j is
realised.
RPMj = p(Rj = true)EU |Rj = true. (4)
We will now consider that the decision maker has a set of a = 1, . . . , A risk mitigation actions
available that change the probability of some risks occurring and therefore, because of interdependence
between risks, influence the whole network of risks. These actions can be combined in any way to
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form a mitigation strategy and we denote a typical risk mitigation strategy by σk. We let σ0 denote
the (costless) strategy ‘do nothing’ so the network is in its original configuration; σ2A−1 means do
everything. There are 2A combinations of risk mitigation actions (including doing nothing) in the set
of mitigation strategies that we denote K. By undertaking a risk mitigation strategy the probability
with which each state of the network (in terms of performance measures) is realised is influenced, and
therefore we write these probabilities as a function of the risk mitigation strategy adopted, pi(σk). Risk
mitigation is a costly exercise; we write Ck as the cost of undertaking the strategy σk. To evaluate a
realisation of the network after undertaking a mitigation strategy, we should write a decision-maker’s
utility as a function of both si, the state of the performance measures and Ck, the cost of mitigation,
so the expected utility resulting from undertaking risk mitigation strategy k would be
∑
i∈I
pi(σk)U(si, Ck).
However, operationally this specification would require that we elicit utility values over each state
of the network in every possible cost realisation, which is often not feasible. To circumvent this
problem, we assume that utility is separable in the evaluation of the state of the network and the cost
of mitigation (Wilson & Quigley, 2016). To scale the evaluation of the cost of mitigation strategies we
define a utility value for the cost v(Ck) that yields a utility of 1 if there is no cost and then reduces
to a minimum value of zero as the cost of mitigation increases. Further, we consider a ‘weighted net
evaluation’ (WNE) of a mitigation strategy, which is defined as
WNE(σk) = (1− α)EU(σk) + αv(Ck) (5)
where
EU(σk) =
∑
i∈I
pi(σk)u(si). (6)
α captures the importance of cost to the decision maker, and we propose using the method of ‘swing
weights’ (Belton & Stewart, 2002) to determine the value of this parameter. The decision maker is first
asked to consider that both utility (relative to objectives) and cost are at the least preferred states (all
risks realised and maximum possible cost of strategies incurred amounting to the utility value of 0).
Subsequently, he is given a scenario that only one of these could be improved to the best possible state
(giving a utility of 1) and is asked which he would prefer; the one picked by him should receive the
maximum weight (100) reflecting the significance of that criterion. He is then required to assess the
overall value (over a scale of 0− 100) arising from a swing from 0 to 1 on the other criterion. Letting
this be x, the weight assigned to the chosen criterion is 100/(100 + x) and that assigned to the other
is x/(100 + x). This process thus determines the value of α for a decision maker.
17
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Problem of Selecting Optimal Risk Mitigation Strategies. Having defined the way in which decision
makers assess the outcome of undertaking a mitigation strategy, we now define the objective function
of a decision maker, which is to choose the mitigation strategy that maximises the WNE of risk
mitigation, subject to the constraint that the cost of mitigation must not exceed a threshold, C¯:
max
σk∈K
WNE(σk) s.t. Ck ≤ C¯.
5. Application of the Proposed Process
5.1. Description of the Case Study
Founded in the early 20th Century, Aero is a leading global supplier of products, solutions and
services within rolling bearings, seals, mechatronics, services and lubrication systems. Having 120
manufacturing units established in 29 countries and a distribution network across 130 countries, Aero
serves a diversified mix of industries, including cars and light trucks, marine, aerospace, renewable
energy, railway, metal, machine tool, medical and food and beverage.
The respondents were selected on the basis of their expertise in risk management in general and
SCRM/project risk management in particular. A total of seven semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with details of the experts given in Table A.2. Each interview lasted for 90 minutes on average
(with the minimum and maximum time of 70 and 120 minutes, respectively). A total of three focus
group sessions were also held involving the development and validation of the model and communication
of the results with each session lasting for 2 hours on average.
5.2. Model Development and Results
Five performance objectives namely quality, timeliness, market share, profit and sustainability
were identified during the interviews. These objectives are interrelated as market share influences the
profit margin and also, quality, timeliness and profit are potentially conflicting objectives. Instead
of following a bottom-up approach as adopted in the Event Tree analysis, we developed the network
using the FTA that utilises a top-down approach. The network was developed involving two members
from the risk management group. They were asked to focus on a one-year time horizon and assess
the probability of risks within that timeframe. Furthermore, the main focus was on identifying only
main risks that would ultimately influence the performance objectives of the company. This exercise
of brainstorming and linking risks to the performance measures identified (as used in the FTA) was
guided by the principles of modelling a BBN (Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004).
Once the qualitative structure of the network was developed, two other members of the group were
involved in validating the structure. Some changes were suggested by the members in terms of adding
new nodes to the network like financial issues and communication plan among others that were finally
included after deliberation. The final qualitative part of the model is shown in Figure 4 with details of
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risks presented in Table A.3. One main feature of the developed structure is capturing interdependency
between risks ranging across different categories namely supply, demand, process and control risks
(Christopher et al., 2011) and therefore, instead of conceptualising risks into distinct categories, we
focus on intra- and inter- dependency across all such categories in the form of a risk network as shown
in Figure 5. Control risks represent the problems associated with the management policies and these
can be considered as the common causes affecting the entire network of risks as shown in Figure 4. For
example, poor management policies might adversely affect the motivation of employees which in turn
would influence the production rate and even the quality might be compromised triggering customer
dissatisfaction.
Following the qualitative validation of the risk network, another focus group session was held to
quantify the model. Two of the participants were engineers and well conversant with the fundamentals
of probability theory and therefore, it was not difficult to elicit conditional probability values. However,
not all participants were comfortable with providing the probability values. Therefore, a qualitative
scale was introduced to elicit probability and utility values as shown in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2,
respectively.
The quantitative part was validated through conducting the sensitivity analysis during which some
conditional probability values had to be revised as the participants were not satisfied with some of
the sensitivity results. The updated probabilities of the quality (low), timeliness (delayed), market
share (low), profit (low) and sustainability (low) were calculated as 0.35, 0.08, 0.68, 0.60 and 0.33,
respectively. The (red) shade of a node represents its relative importance for the utility node in terms
of the propagation impact whereas the thickness of an arc reflects the strength of interdependency
(influence) between the interconnected nodes. The participants agreed with the optimistic results for
quality, timeliness and sustainability and somehow justified their concern with regard to the higher
probabilities associated with market share and profit. The results also conformed to their perception
about the efficacy of already implemented strategies.
The decision maker was interviewed to determine the ‘utility’ associated with different values of the
objectives as shown in Table A.4 and potential mitigation strategies were identified during another focus
group session with associated costs shown in Table A.5. The strategies were finally mapped on the risk
network as shown in Figure A.3 and the impact of each strategy was established through eliciting the
relevant conditional probability values. The rectangular shaped nodes (except the objectives appearing
at the top) represent all possible strategies. Once all the potential strategies were implemented, the
updated probabilities of the quality (low), timeliness (delayed), market share (low), profit (low) and
sustainability (low) were calculated as 0.23, 0.05, 0.37, 0.33 and 0.24, respectively. The efficacy of
strategies elicited was validated through conducting sensitivity analysis.
The model was simulated for each possible combination of strategies (29 iterations) and the expected
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Figure 4: Network of interacting risks and risk sources with no potential strategies implemented (GeNIe).
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Figure 5: The relationship between supply chain risks (adapted from Christopher et al. 2011).
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Figure 6: Variation of expected utility (specific to performance measures) with mitigation cost.
utility value evaluated for each instance. Figure 6 plots the cost and expected utility combinations
for each of the strategies. If a decision maker was targetting a particular cost of implementation they
should choose the strategy that gives the highest expected utility for that cost. Note that increasing
the cost of mitigation does not always improve utility, as can be seen in the range 195 − 235 units of
cost.
The maximum weighted net evaluation of risk mitigation was mapped subject to different weights
assigned to the expected utility and cost of strategies as shown in Figure 7. This graph provides as a
validity check as the cost of the optimal solution is decreasing as the weight attached to cost increases
(higher α). Next, the optimal investment level (one maximising the WNE of risk mitigation) with
respect to the budget constraint was determined as shown in Figure 8. A decision maker assigning
equal importance to the improvement in expected utility value and the mitigation cost must never
invest in strategies costing more than 30 units. Similarly if the decision maker attributes 90% of the
importance to the improvement in expected utility, the investment level should be increased to 165
units.
The efficacy of undertaking a risk mitigation strategy can be conveniently illustrated to decision
makers. With the network in a particular state, consider a plot of the probability of each risk being
realised against the expected utility consequence if it is realised, as in Figure 9. Following Ruan
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Figure 7: Variation of maximum weighted net evaluation (WNE) of risk mitigation with different importance weights
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Figure 9: Risk matrix representing current state of risks (with no potential strategies implemented).
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Figure 10: Risk matrix representing state of risks after implementation of the strategy “do everything” (all actions).
et al. (2015), this space can be partitioned into high, medium and low risk zones by using appropriate
indifference curves. Implementing a risk mitigation strategy changes the location of risks as illustrated
in Figure 10, and visualising the effect of a risk strategy on the location of those risks - in particular
in relation to the critical thresholds - can assist decision-makers in reaching an optimal conclusion if
such thresholds exist in the decision-maker’s value system that are not captured by a simple expected
utility measure.
6. Discussion and Implications
As the main aim of our research was to address two related questions, we discuss hereafter the
implications of the research findings in order to explicitly address each question.
6.1. A SCRM Process Integrating Interdependent Factors and the Risk Appetite
In this section, we present a brief comparison of the proposed approach with the interdependency
based approaches applied in other research areas and discuss the theoretical and managerial implica-
tions of the research.
RQ1: How can we develop and operationalise a SCRM process that captures interdependencies
between risks, multiple (potentially conflicting) objectives (performance measures) and risk mitigation
strategies specific to the risk appetite of a decision maker?
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6.1.1. Comparison of the Proposed Approach with Interdependency Based Approaches in other Appli-
cation Areas
With respect to interdependency modelling, there are a number of approaches (similar to the ones
discussed in Section 2.2) applied to other application areas including but not limited to project risk
management (Qazi et al., 2016; Zhang, 2016), enterprise resource planning (Aloini et al., 2012a,b)
and reliability of engineering systems (Ashrafi et al., 2015). Using the unique features of BBNs and
EUT, the proposed approach not only captures probabilistic interdependency between risks but also
integrates the risk appetite of a decision maker within the risk management process. We are not aware
of any such risk management process especially in the literature on SCRM and project risk management
that utilises the concept similar to WNE or introduces the ‘probability-conditional expected utility’
matrix for prioritising strategies and risks, respectively specific to the risk appetite of a decision maker.
Network theory and ISM based tools are useful in assessing the driving and dependency influence
of risks (Aloini et al., 2012a,b) whereas the proposed framework integrates these key features with the
ability to model strength of interdependency between risks. The risk network provides an effective
visual tool to help the decision maker prioritise risks on the basis of relative probability and propaga-
tion impact values thereby considering a holistic view of multiple factors including the position of a
risk within the network, its influence on the key performance measures identified, and its probability
of occurrence. The operationalisation scheme introduced in the paper provides an opportunity for
researchers from diversified fields including but not limited to safety and reliability engineering, deci-
sion making under uncertainty, data analytics, and multi-criteria decision analysis to explore similar
combinations of suitable techniques that could be adapted to the context of SCRM and easily adopted
by practitioners.
6.1.2. Theoretical Implications
For better understanding, a block diagram is presented as Figure 11 which manifests the method-
ological contribution of this study to the established risk management process (SA, 2009). Although
the application of the proposed process is demonstrated for a one-time decision problem of prioritising
risks and mitigation strategies (at time: T = t0), it can easily be extended to monitor and re-evaluate
risks and strategies periodically. One of the key merits of the SCRNM process shown in Figure 3 is the
operationalisation of each stage to help supply chain managers adopt an empirically tested technique
for managing risks. This process also presents a unique integration of modelling interdependent risks,
the decision maker’s risk appetite and the trade-off across performance measures. There is a great deal
of complexity associated with capturing the non-linear interactions between supply chain risks and
performance measures, utility of the decision maker with regards to the tradeoff across these measures,
and their risk appetite with regards to the cost and benefit of risk mitigation. For a detailed discussion
on each stage of the risk management process, interested readers may consult SA (2009).
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Figure 11: A block diagram representing the contribution of the proposed approach to the established risk management
process (SA, 2009).
Risk Identification. Instead of following the conventional risk classification schemes the process intro-
duces development of a risk and performance network where performance measures (objectives) are
identified first followed by linking risks to these measures. Adopting such a technique (similar to the
FTA) helps in not only modelling material risks but also common cause failures. The participants
involved in developing the risk network were able to identify around 65 connections within the net-
work. Furthermore, few risks located at the bottom of the network (business continuity management
culture, risk management culture) were evaluated as critical risks having major influence on a number
of risks. The selection of risks material to the performance measures identified is corroborated by
Figure 9 where all risks possess higher values of conditional expected utility values representing the
greater strength of interdependency within the risk network.
Risk Analysis. Risk matrix based tools and interdependency based models proposed in the literature
generally focus on a single performance measure (monetary loss resulting from a risk realised) (Garvey
et al., 2015; Qazi et al., 2017) whereas it is important to consider all material performance measures
including but not limited to quality, time, profit, competitive advantage, sustainability, cost and rep-
utation. Instead of focussing on the monetary value of a loss resulting from a risk, the proposed
process utilises the concept of conditional expected utility and each risk is evaluated with respect to
its probability and influence on the overall expected utility across the risk network in terms of the risk
propagation measure (see Equation 4). Instead of mapping each risk onto a probability-impact matrix
(Khan et al., 2008; Duijm, 2015), the process introduces the ‘probability-conditional expected utility’
matrix thereby capturing the impact of each risk on all performance measures identified.
Risk Treatment and Risk Monitoring. In contrast with the treatment of individual risks and selection
of individual risk specific strategies as followed in the conventional risk matrix based tools (Khan et al.,
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2008; Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011), the proposed process helps in mapping risk mitigation strategies
onto the risk network modelled. ‘Weighted net evaluation of risk mitigation’ and the method of ‘swing
weights’ make it possible to establish the trade-off between the efficacy of potential risk mitigation
strategies and the associated cost keeping in view the risk appetite of a decision maker. Ignoring
the proposed process would increase the risk of selecting sub-optimal strategies. As the proposed
process is grounded in the framework of BBNs, it is very easy to update the model once new risks
are identified without the need for developing a new model from scratch. Similarly, a BBN based
model can be easily maintained and monitored over a longer period to conduct a longitudinal study
and systematically analyse important lessons learnt.
6.1.3. Managerial Implications
Based on the results of the case study, we introduce following propositions that will help the supply
chain managers appreciate the significance of implementing a comprehensive interdependency based
SCRM process.
Proposition 1. Neglecting interdependency between risks and strategies would risk the decision maker
over- (under-) investing in implementing strategies.
In case of an exclusively independent supply risk network with no correlations between the risks, risk
exposure is the summation of risk values corresponding to individual risks. Treating such independent
risks with strategies influencing individual risks would yield a marginal benefit in terms of reducing
(increasing) the overall risk exposure (expected utility). However, when there is a positive (negative)
correlation between any single pair of risks a risk mitigation strategy targetting only one of these risks
will generate a net reduction (increase) in the overall risk exposure that will be greater (smaller) than
the case with no correlation between the risks. Therefore, a firm interested in achieving a specific risk
exposure needs to invest less (more) if realisation of any risk triggers other risks and the strategies
implemented have positive (negative) impact on the risk network.
For the risk network modelled (see Figure 4), optimal investment levels subject to different risk
appetite and budget constraints are shown in Figure 8. Without following the proposed approach
and ignoring interdependency between risks and strategies, the decision maker might select strategies
that are optimal for individual risks, however, these might represent a sub-optimal choice (dominated
combination of strategies) (see Figure 6). It is interesting to note that the impact of selecting sub-
optimal strategies is a non-linear function of investment level whereas the associated probability is
a function of available combinations of strategies. The importance of this proposition was rightly
acknowledged by one of our respondents:
“I think that the process helped us develop a risk network in a very short time and it was quite
helpful to think through developing the network from the performance measures. We could identify
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some interesting patterns and specifically the identification of sub-optimal strategies through the process
is fascinating and worth investing time and effort. I am sure that such decision tools will add real value
to any enterprise and help them make efficient investment decisions” (Resp#1).
Proposition 2. The upper (lower) bound of the expected utility value corresponding to the set of objec-
tives modelled within a risk network is determined by the efficacy of potential (already implemented)
risk mitigation strategies in reducing the risk level of related risks.
All performance measures are not necessarily equally important to the decision maker (Ju¨ttner
et al., 2003). When these performance measures are treated in isolation and independently optimised,
the resulting strategies might not yield a global optimal solution corresponding to the holistic interac-
tion of these measures within the network setting. Expected utility is a probability-weighted average of
the utility in the different states the network may be in. By engaging in risk mitigation, the probability
of these states occurring changes, as does the value of the objectives. More generally, a utility function
could capture different weights being assigned to different objectives, objectives may be evaluated in
a non-linear way, and complementarities between objectives could be captured.
The lower bound of the expected utility reflects the efficacy of already implemented strategies as to
how comfortable the decision maker is with regard to the current state of the risk management process.
With reference to the model developed in the case study, the point corresponding to the mitigation
cost of 0 represents the efficacy of already implemented strategies with the global minimum expected
utility value of 0.528 (see Figure 6). This lower bound can further drop in the event of unfavorable
correlations within the network. However, as the proposed risk mitigation strategies were negatively
correlated with all risks, the expected utility of the network would not reduce below 0.528. The upper
bound of the expected utility is determined by the efficacy of potential strategies, however, there is
another constraint of the budget and the need for an important consideration as to the significance of
the relative improvement in expected utility with respect to the marginal cost of implementing these
strategies. Although an investment of 295 units yields the highest expected utility to the decision maker
(see Figure 6), the same is not viable considering the cost-effectiveness of strategies (see Figure 8).
The trade-off between the reduction in risk exposure and the cost involved in implementing strategies
is governed by the weight the decision-maker attached to the cost (see Equation 5). The participants
involved in the case study were able to link this proposition to the significance of adopting the proposed
process as it is not possible to ascertain these limits using traditional risk matrix based models and
also, the performance of the risk management process could be benchmarked against these limits, once
established.
Proposition 3. Even in the case of all risks being positively correlated with each other and strategies
negatively correlated with risks, increased investment in strategies might not necessarily increase the
expected utility of the decision maker.
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Keeping in view a given set of potential risk mitigation strategies with associated cost, there are
different possible combinations of strategies subject to a budget constraint with only one optimal com-
bination (see Figure 6). However, with the increase in the budget constraint, it is not always the
case that the new optimal combination contains all strategies included in the optimal set previously
determined subject to a lower constraint that could lead to a reduction in the expected utility (see
the budget range of 195 − 235 in Figure 6). Therefore, there is always a need for analysing a com-
plete portfolio of all such combinations of strategies rather than evaluating the strategies at the given
constraint only. The optimistic viewpoint with regards to the favourable correlations between risks
and strategies might be misleading as a supply chain manager would incorrectly assume that investing
in additional strategies and choosing the optimal combination right at the constraint level is viable.
The supply chain risk managers involved in our case study appreciated the fact that without using
the proposed modelling approach, they would not be able to realise that it was not worth investing in
strategies representing the budget range of 195 − 235. Related to this, they were able to identify all
such combinations of sub-optimal strategies.
Proposition 4. Within a network setting and in the case of partially effective risk mitigation strategies,
it is not always optimal to mitigate the most critical risk(s) identified; instead strategies implemented
for relatively non-critical risk(s) might be cost-effective.
It is very important to realise that within a risk management framework with interdependence (see
Figure 3), risk prioritisation follows the risk treatment stage in contrast to the sequence proposed in
the standard risk management framework (SA, 2009) and established SCRM frameworks (Manuj &
Mentzer, 2008; Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011; Giannakis & Papadopoulos, 2016). This is because of
the complexity involved in evaluating the efficacy of strategies that is a function of the strength of
interdependency between risks, the relative impact of strategies, the cost of these strategies and the
relative importance of performance measures influenced by the risks. Therefore, implementing cost-
effective strategies might not necessarily reduce the most critical risks substantially and that is why
the risk assessment must follow the risk treatment stage to prioritise risks for the risk monitoring stage
and developing contingency plans.
With reference to the model developed, although R20 is evaluated as a critical risk during the risk
assessment stage (see Figure 9), it is not optimal to adopt the relevant strategy subject to a budget
constraint of 30 units (see Figure 6 and Table A.5). This is because the optimal set comprises two cost-
effective mitigation strategies applied to relatively less critical risks (R4 and R12) yielding maximum
expected utility to the decision maker whereas exclusively mitigating R20 is the most expensive option
(costing 100 units) among the set of potential strategies (see Table A.5). Therefore, it is not always
optimal to mitigate the most critical risk(s) identified. Adopting a risk matrix based approach would
fail to capture the complex dynamics between risks and strategies considering the cost of strategies
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and relative importance of each performance measure. This proposition is also substantiated through
comparing Figure 9 and Figure 10 where R26 remains a critical risk even after implementing all
strategies. Hence, the implementation of potential strategies does not necessarily mitigate risks in
their order of criticality rather the significance of these strategies is a function of their relative position
in the network, associated cost, risk mitigation effectiveness and the decision maker’s preference in
reducing the cost adjusted risk exposure.
6.2. Merits and Challenges
In this section, we present our findings about the current practices followed in the industry and
describe the merits and challenges associated with the implementation of the proposed process. Sample
quotations from the interview narratives are presented in Appendix B.
RQ2: What are the merits and challenges associated with the implementation of the proposed
process?
6.2.1. Current Practices
The main aim of the study was to develop and empirically evaluate an integrated SCRM process
and to investigate the merits and challenges associated with implementing the process. The case study
helped us gain an insight into the real practices of managing supply chain risks. Our findings conform
to the widely reported literature on supply chain risk classification where risks are classified into
independent categories and on risk management frameworks where the notion of assessing these risks
in silo is embraced (Rangel et al., 2015). Limited tools or techniques focussing on the interdependency
modelling are confined to optimising a single performance measure and therefore, the optimisation of
these measures in isolation does not necessarily yield a global optimal solution (Colicchia & Strozzi,
2012; Garvey et al., 2015). This finding corroborates the study conducted by Ho et al. (2015) who have
emphasised the need for integrating all stages of the risk management process and linking systemic risks
to (potentially conflicting) objectives. The participants also echoed the same concern and acknowledged
the limitation of existing practices.
6.2.2. Merits of the Proposed Process
The participants involved in the case study found it a very interesting exercise to develop a risk
network and link risks to multiple performance measures. Related to this, the use of an approach
similar to the FTA was highly appreciated as it would ensure focussing on important risks only and
not considering risks having insignificant impact on a performance measure. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, there are limited studies having explored the use of FTA in modelling supply chain risks
(Sherwin et al., 2016). However, merging the two techniques of FTA and BBNs helps in modelling
common cause failures that cannot be achieved through the use of FTA alone.
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The elicitation of conditional probability values was easier in the case of experts having background
knowledge in engineering or mathematical science whereas it was a challenging task otherwise. The use
of a qualitative scale helped the experts provide their judgement and with the passage of time, they
were able to indicate numeric values. The participants could appreciate the significance of optimising
conflicting objectives within the same model. The main merit of the proposed process was acknowledged
as the ability to visualise the interconnectedness between the risks and how exactly a risk or a set of
risks influences multiple objectives. Techniques other than BBNs are not able to depict the similar kind
of transparency and visual patterns of risk propagation (Garvey et al., 2015). The graphs representing
the efficacy of potential risk mitigation strategies were highly appreciated as these helped the decision
makers realise the significance of adopting the proposed process without which it would not be possible
to segregate optimal strategies from the dominated ones.
Another key feature of the process acknowledged by the participants relates to capturing both the
trade-off between difference performance measures and the influence of interdependent risks on these
measures as one of the respondents mentioned that: “We do not have tools to model the trade-off
across the objectives within an interdependent setting of interacting risks. If you do not map the main
sources of risks to your performance and if you do not map the correlations then you can have a serious
problem and now we are able to identify the main limitation of our current process” (Resp#4). As the
organisation studied currently utilises a risk matrix based tool, the proposed ‘probability-conditional
expected utility’ risk matrix was considered a very relevant and significant contribution. Substantiating
the utility of the proposed process, the participants realised that soft factors like corporate governance
and risk management culture, and unquantifiable risks like regulatory changes and reputational damage
could easily be captured in the modelling process as there is no such requirement of establishing risk
specific monetary loss values.
6.2.3. Challenges Associated with the Adoption of Proposed Process
Despite acknowledging the merits of the proposed process, the participants were apprehensive of the
challenges involved. As the risk management process is often governed by regulations, the established
frameworks like SA (2009) with their exclusive focus on evaluating and managing individual risks
would need to be challenged and replaced by interdependency based frameworks. The second major
problem relates to the organisational culture and the resistance to change. The development of SCRM
in theory dates back to the start of 21st century (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008) and therefore, it is too
early for practitioners to realise and implement the risk management process in its true essence. It
needs a lot of commitment from the top management to indoctrinate the culture of risk management
as practitioners mostly rely on their intuition and past experiences and they tend to be reluctant to
change their practices. Also, it needs a lot of effort in terms of educating the people involved and
maintaining such models over a period of time.
30
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
6.3. Limitations and Future Research Directions
Studies focussing on the cost and benefit analysis of implementing these sophisticated frameworks
would incentivise practitioners towards adopting interdependency modelling in managing risks. Like
advocated by Ackermann & Alexander (2016), we think that there is a need for “finding mechanisms
to encourage the application of the (interdependency based) approach” (Ackermann & Alexander, 2016,
p. 899) by SCRM professionals. Similarly, the dynamic nature of risk could be captured as the risk
networks “created at a particular point in time could be compared with those of a later time period thus
enabling longitudinal analysis of projects, allowing for shifting patterns of behaviour to be explored”
(Ackermann & Alexander, 2016, p. 899).
Although risk matrix based tools have been criticised for their inherent limitations, there is a great
opportunity to improve these mainly because of their popularity with practitioners (Duijm, 2015). In
the proposed process, we improve the conventional risk matrix in terms of capturing the network-wide
impact of individual risks. However, it might be interesting to develop such maps to reflect systemic
interaction between risks and project multiple risk scenarios. Furthermore, conventional tools must be
further developed to capture the dynamic nature of risk. As the risk network developed does not cover
all aspects of the supply chain including engineering facets mainly because of the main intention of
demonstrating the proposed process and not developing a comprehensive risk network, future research
may be directed to developing such risk networks specific to different industries. This will help in
developing a risk network based taxonomy and understanding common patterns of risk paths.
We have mainly used BBNs to model interdependency between risks, it is worth integrating a
number of techniques feasible for each stage of the process and validating the efficacy of the resulting
hybrid risk management process through case studies. Algorithms can be developed to establish the
efficacy of such integrated tools considering the effort involved and the precision of results obtained. The
case study presented was a one-time demonstration of the proposed process whereas it is important to
explore the long-term implications of adopting the process through conducting longitudinal case studies.
For simplicity of exposition we have treated risks as binary variables, and it would be interesting to
extend this in a meaningful way to more general characterisations of risk. It would also be interesting to
consider extending the framework to account for different stakeholders across a supply chain that may
have conflicting objectives and conceptualise contractual frameworks to encourage active participation
of stakeholders within the risk management process.
7. Conclusions
Although a number of quantitative tools and techniques have already been developed for managing
supply chain risks, there is a limited focus on introducing holistic frameworks that not only integrate all
stages of the risk management process but also capture the cascading effects of common risk triggers and
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the risk appetite of a decision maker. Also, existing frameworks generally focus on optimising a single
objective (performance measure) without exclusively modelling the trade-off between conflicting and
interdependent objectives. Another important requirement is to empirically evaluate these frameworks
and establish the merits and challenges involved in implementing such interdependency based tools.
In order to bridge the mentioned gaps, we have developed and operationalised an integrated SCRNM
process, and conducted a case study to demonstrate its application. Established techniques from safety
and reliability engineering, decision making under uncertainty and multi-criteria decision analysis were
adapted and integrated together to operationalise the proposed process.
The organisation studied exclusively utilises risk matrix based tools to assess risks. As conceptu-
alised in the literature, risks are classified into independent categories and correlations are neglected
in all stages of the risk management process. Such assumptions are deleterious to the main objec-
tive of implementing an effective process as the risk health of a supply chain might be suboptimal
if interdependencies in the risk network are ignored. Developing a risk network originating from the
performance measures helps in confining the scope to significant risks only and therefore, risks having
insignificant impact on the measures are not considered. The risk network also helps in identifying
potential mitigation strategies and establishing their correlations with relevant risks.
The practitioners adhere to using conventional tools treating risks as independent factors because
of various reasons: sophisticated interdependency based tools introduced in theory are rarely applied
in industry; practitioners are unable to appreciate the significance of capturing correlations until they
acknowledge the extent of damage relevant to adopting risk matrix based tools; use of risk matrix is
governed by established risk management standards; and there is not always a commitment from the
top management as the implementation of a robust process necessitates time and investment in terms
of training staff and enhancing their knowledge to assimilate the underlying mechanism of the process.
There are some limitations of our study: we have only conducted a single case study and not
involved other stakeholders of the supply chain; the risk network developed does not cover all aspects
of the supply chain as the main aim was to demonstrate the application of the proposed process and
therefore, not all categories of supply chain risks are considered; we have captured one-time risk state of
the risk network rather than monitoring the dynamic nature of the risk; risks and mitigation strategies
are modelled as binary variables; and conflicting incentives of main stakeholders are not modelled. The
research work can be developed further along different lines of inquiry. The efficacy of the proposed
process may be monitored over a period of time through a longitudinal study and the merits and
challenges analysed. The framework may be extended to involve different stakeholders across the supply
chain and contracts be designed to encourage active participation of the stakeholders. Comprehensive
risk networks may be developed across different industries and compared to establish common patterns
in order to develop a generalised risk network based taxonomy. The cost and benefit analysis may be
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conducted to help practitioners understand the utility of interdependency based frameworks with regard
to the resources dedicated to a similar process and the benefits resulting from its implementation. Once
the framework gets established in its simplified form of risks and strategies with binary states, more
general characterisation of risks can be captured. The framework may also be extended to capture the
dynamic behavior of risk over time.
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Appendix A.
 
Article 
Interdependency 
modelling of 
risks 
Risk 
Appetite 
Interdependency 
between risks and 
strategies 
Qualitative (*)/ 
Quantitative (o) 
Harland et al. (2003)    * 
Hallikas et al. (2004)    * 
Giunipero and Eltantawy (2004)    * 
Norrman and Jansson (2004)    Semi-quantitative 
Sinha et al. (2004)    * 
Kleindorfer and Saad (2005)    Semi-quantitative 
Khan et al. (2008)    * 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008)   x * 
Knemeyer et al. (2009)  x x Semi-quantitative 
Oehmen et al. (2009) x  x * 
Tuncel and Alpan (2010)   x o 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011)    * 
Lavastre et al. (2012)  x  Semi-quantitative 
Elleuch et al. (2014)   x o 
Rotaru et al. (2014)    * 
Micheli et al. (2014)   x o 
Aqlan and Lam (2015)   x o 
Giannakis and Papadopoulos (2016) x   Semi-quantitative 
Qazi et al. (2017) x  x o 
 
Table A.1: Selected articles with focus on different research themes.
Designation 
Work experience  
(no. of years) 
Respondent ID 
Risk Manager  19 Resp#1 
Purchasing and Supply Chain Manager 25 Resp#2 
Loss Prevention Analyst 5 Resp#3 
Insurance Manager 13 Resp#4 
Project Manager 20 Resp#5 
Project Risk Manager 15 Resp#6 
Project Risk Manager 16 Resp#7 
 
ID 
R1 
R2 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
R7 
R8 
R9 
R10 
R11 
R12 
R13 
R14 
R15 
R16 
R17 
R18 
R19 
R20 
 (EHS) R21 
R22 
R23 
R24 
R25 
R26 
R27 
R28 
Table A.2: Profile of respondents (semi-structured interviews).
1
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Risk/Risk Source States ID 
Unexpected event (Supplier) Yes, No R1 
Unexpected event (Aero) Yes, No R2 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) System disruption 
(Supplier) 
Yes, No 
R3 
ICT System disruption (Aero) Yes, No R4 
Corporate governance Bad, Good R5 
Regulatory changes Yes, No R6 
Investment in loss prevention and sustainability Low, High R7 
Labour related diseases Yes, No R8 
Fatal accident Yes, No R9 
Breaking code of conduct Yes, No R10 
Business continuity management culture Bad, Good R11 
Risk management culture Bad, Good R12 
Strikes (Aero) Yes, No R13 
Strikes (Supplier) Yes, No R14 
Lack of control (Aero) Yes, No R15 
Lack of control (Supplier) Yes, No R16 
Lack of procedures (Aero) Yes, No R17 
Lack of procedure (Supplier) Yes, No R18 
Logistics problems Yes, No R19 
Aero price vs. Competitor price High, Low R20 
Supplier problems with environmental, health and safety (EHS) Yes, No R21 
Communication plan Ineffective, 
Effective 
R22 
Change in specification by customer Yes, No R23 
Customer pressure on delivery Yes, No R24 
Financial issues Yes, No R25 
Aero quality vs. Competitor quality Low, High R26 
Human error (Aero) Yes, No R27 
Human error (Supplier) Yes, No R28 
 
Table A.3: Risks and risk sources considered in the modelling framework.
Almost certain 
Highly likely 
Likely 
Fifty-fifty 
Unlikely 
Highly unlikely 
Almost uncertain 
Range (Point estimate) Classification 
(0.99) 
0.8-1 (0.9) 
0.6-0.8 (0.7) 
0.4-0.6 (0.5) 
0.2-0.4 (0.3) 
0-0.2 (0.1) 
(0.01) 
) tion 
Figure A.1: Scale used for eliciting probability values.
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Maximum 
Very high 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Very low 
Minimum 
Range (Point estimate) Classification 
(1) 
0.8-1 (0.9) 
0.6-0.8 (0.7) 
0.4-0.6 (0.5) 
0.2-0.4 (0.3) 
0-0.2 (0.1) 
(0) 
Figure A.2: Scale used for eliciting utility values.
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Table A.4: Utility values specific to different states of the objectives.
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Risk Mitigation Action Cost (Monetary units) 
Contract Terms 20 
Quality Training 20 
Perform Business Interruption Analysis 20 
Adopt Enterprise Risk Management Model 30 
Perform Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) Testing 10 
Union Relations 5 
Economies of Scale 30 
Flexibility 60 
Reduce Cost 100 
High 
   High
 0.6
High 
   High
45  55 0.8
ctivities 
Timely 
    Low
) ) ) ) ) ) ) 0.5 
Table A.5: Potential risk mitigation strategies and associated cost.
 
Figure A.3: Network of interacting risks, risk sources and potential strategies (GeNIe).
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Appendix B. Findings on the Value and Contribution of SCRNM: Semi-Structured In-
terviews
This section is a collection of sample quotations from the interview narratives transcribed. The
findings are organised into three categories: current practices of managing supply chain risks; benefits
of implementing the proposed process; and the challenges involved in implementing the process.
Current Practices of Managing Supply Chain Risks
Most participants believed that there are established guidelines to conduct the risk management
and generally the endeavor is to adopt the risk management standards within the enterprise. As
reported in the literature, risks are classified into separate categories and assessed accordingly.
“We have standard templates which guide us what kind of topics and risks to consider during the
risk management process. ... We have a tool where we nail down all kinds of risks. Cost estimation
and probability are documented and signed by all stakeholders” (Resp#6).
“We are still in a position that we don’t adopt ISO 31000 standard yet. So, actually we adopt COSO
(Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission) model and classify risks into
two categories: financial risks and pure risks. Pure risks are subject to losses that are to some extent
insurable whereas financial risks are associated with opportunities as well as downside risks” (Resp#1).
“During risk analysis, a team composed of different team members with different roles assesses
risks. The risks are considered without any correlation. Usually, given the probability and impact of
risks, we try to implement mitigation plans on high risks in the risk review meeting. The risks are
categorised according to the business area and categories like commercial, operational, logistics etc. are
used” (Resp#7).
A few participants acknowledged the limitation of their current practices; however, others were
optimistic about the efficacy of ISO 31000 (SA, 2009) based frameworks.
“I think that the risk management process is quite mature and it serves our purpose. We started
from much shallow position few years back. Project and risk management offices were introduced across
the organisation to cope with the requirement of systematically managing risks” (Resp#5).
“Since the beginning of this year, we are trying to broaden the scope of risk analysis because in silo
view, we miss important things. Still we are not working on the ERM (Enterprise Risk Management)
perspective. Different pieces are put together by different groups and the current risk management
process does not capture the systemic interactions” (Resp#1).
With regards to the risk treatment, it was revealed that there is no such procedure to model the
trade-off between performance measures. Similarly, it is assumed that a strategy only affects a single
risk and therefore, not much effort is made to assess the correlations between strategies and risks.
“During the risk review meeting, the team agrees on the selection of strategies to address the risks.
Commercial issues like customer satisfaction are the main risks. The experience and knowledge of
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the team members help in selecting the best strategy to apply. For each risk, you could apply different
strategies and therefore, we assess different plans” (Resp#6).
“There is no tool available to model the trade-off involved in the objectives. For well-known risks,
we take proactive approach. If we already know from our experience about the potential risks, we rely
on proactive approach. However, the risk management process is more reactive. To be honest, today it
is more reactive where the risks are not predictable” (Resp#2).
“The only thing I can think of is historical trend analysis. It is not really a methodology rather it
is based on historical data and best practices. There is a strong element of the experience of people. In
very sizable cases, we will appoint people who have done the same thing. ... No, we do not have any
such causal technique to assess strategies within the network of interacting risks” (Resp#7).
“In terms of risk treatment, we are rude in the sense that it is the experience of your supply chain
risk manager and accounts manager because in many cases, the supply chain risk manager is interested
in improving the quality and the accounts manager just wants to reduce the budget. It is a negotiation
between the two parties to reach an agreement. ... Rude in the sense that there is no such complex
process involved in understanding the complex situation” (Resp#6).
“We have different tools for managing risks but there is no link between the two. Like there is one
tool for tracking the quality of a product. The other is for tracking the cost but there is no connection
between the two. There is no evaluation of cost and effort involved in implementing a mitigation
strategy” (Resp#7).
Benefits of Implementing the Proposed Process
The participants involved in developing the model appreciated the significance of capturing inter-
dependencies between risks and mitigation strategies.
“To start more people around the table will actually help capture holistic risks across different
disciplines. If you build it for a certain project and supply chain characteristics putting much more
expert knowledge, the graph would be relevant and even if new risks are introduced, the same graph can
be used without starting from the scratch” (Resp#3).
“It boils down to what happens in reality. It is all about risk management. You can only evaluate
after you have gone through the (risk management) process a number of times, and experienced and
recorded risks. Once the process is implemented and fully integrated within the organisation, it is more
important to focus on organisational learning and this model can be helpful in monitoring risks over
time and learning from the past experiences” (Resp#5).
“I think that the process helped us develop a risk network in a very short time and it was quite
helpful to think through developing the network from the performance measures. We could identify
some interesting patterns and specifically the identification of sub-optimal strategies through the process
is fascinating and worth investing time and effort. I am sure that such decision tools will add real value
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to any enterprise and help them make efficient investment decisions” (Resp#1).
“It is a very interesting model where you get to know about the correlations between risks. Having
something in place to provide a guideline to initial risk analysis would be a great opportunity as it can
incorporate key lessons from the past in terms of the strength of dependency between risks. The most
powerful thing is to take decisions. Managerial decision making is not always correct as it involves a
number of biases and such tools can help the decision maker look at different facets of the problem”
(Resp#2).
“We do not have tools to model the trade-off across the objectives within an interdependent setting
of interacting risks. If you do not map the main sources of risks to your performance and if you do
not map the correlations then you can have a serious problem and now we are able to identify the main
limitation of our current process” (Resp#4).
“The process will really benefit from the brainstorming session involving top managers where they
will be able to identify interesting patterns of risks and evaluate different strategies” (Resp#1).
Challenges involved in implementing the Process
The main challenges were identified as the commitment to developing and updating the model,
training required to enhancing the skill and knowledge of the team, the focus of established risk
management standards on identifying and assessing independent categories of risks, and the resistance
of the organisation to bringing the paradigm shift.
“Such type of process aimed at modelling interdependency between risks is quite expensive in terms
of involving a lot of people and needing a lot of discipline. There is a cost that the company has to
incur. The first challenge is to evaluate the cost and benefit analysis. The second challenge is about
knowledge and how exactly you develop the competence of people involved in implementing the process.
In case of a very distributed organisation like ours, it is not easy to train all the people across the
organisation. The third challenge is how we capture knowledge in such project driven supply chains
including risk management. It is not a simple thing” (Resp#5).
“If we look at the ISO guide and all the standards, these describe a lot of tools for assessing risks
and return on investment. Companies do not care about these correlation analyses because there is no
such regulatory requirement and also, there is no literature about it from the application perspective”
(Resp#1).
“The challenge is to establish a standard tool. Checking and updating every single risk is really
challenging. Secondly, usability of the tool is very important. The challenge is to get the people work
and use the tool on regular basis. We have plenty of tools. We must be sure that people should be able
to realise the benefit of using a new tool. It is important to demonstrate the merit of the tool so that
its continuous use must be justified and guaranteed” (Resp#7).
“Even if the process or tool is a simple one, there is always a resistance. Organisation is what it
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is so you have to play with the cards you have in your hand. The biggest obstacle is the organisation
as you cannot change it. The main challenge is to convince the top management and internalise the
process. We need to create a steering committee or appoint a CRO (Chief Risk Officer) who is in
charge of the risk management process” (Resp#6).
“It is costly in terms of time but the results are great. The challenge is in terms of eliciting values
from the experts. There will be biases involved in the group decision making” (Resp#2).
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